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1.	  Introduction	  	  
The	  growing	   literature	  on	  social	  ontology	  and	   its	   relevance	   to	  economics	  has	   focussed	  on	  
two	  distinct,	  but	  inter-­‐related	  areas	  since	  it	  began	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  (Lawson,	  1989;	  Mäki,	  
1992).	   First,	   there	   has	   been	   a	   lively	   debate	   about	   the	   links	   between	   ontology	   and	  
methodology.	  Tony	  Lawson’s	  methodological	  critique	  states	  that	  there	  is	  a	  tension	  between	  
the	  employment	  of	  mathematical	  methods	  to	  analyse	  the	  economy	  and	  the	  nature	  of	   the	  	  
social	   relations	   that	   they	   are	   used	   to	   explain	   (Lawson,	   1997).	   Lawson	   and	   other	   critical	  
realists	   have	   argued	   that	   the	   deductivist	   method	   favoured	   by	   mainstream	   economics	  
presupposes	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   closed	   system	  made	   up	   of	   stable	   and	   predictable	   event-­‐
regularities	   (Fleetwood,	   2002;	   Lawson,	   2003;	   2012;	   Lewis,	   2004).	   This	   assumption	   of	   a	  
closed	  system	  is	  deemed	  to	  be	  inapplicable	  in	  the	  social	  sciences	  and	  subsequent	  research	  
has	   focussed	   critical	   attention	   on	   mainstream	   methods	   and	   the	   role	   that	   they	   play	   in	  
delimiting	   and	   constraining	   academic	   research	   (Downward	   and	   Mearman,	   2007;	   Lewis,	  
2006;	  Pratten,	  2004).	  	  
	   The	  methodological	  critique	   is	  bound	  up	  with	  a	  second,	  more	  constructive,	  project	  
involving	  the	  articulation	  and	  defence	  of	  a	  social	  ontology	  that	  treats	  the	  social	  world	  as	  an	  
open	   system.	   Following	   Roy	   Bhaskar	   (1975	   [2008];	   1979	   [1998]),	   contributors	   to	   this	  
literature	  explain	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  social	  and	  natural	  sciences	  by	  referring	  to	  the	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fact	  that	  social	  systems	  are	  made	  up	  of	   intentional	  human	  actors	  with	  the	  power	  to	  make	  
choices.	  As	  Lawson	  puts	  it,	  the	  very	  idea	  of	  human	  choice	  presupposes	  that	  actual	  patterns	  
of	  events	  might	  have	  turned	  out	  otherwise	  (Lawson,	  1997,	  30).	  This	  observation	  also	  lies	  at	  
the	  heart	  of	  Bhaskar’s	  transformational	  model	  of	  social	  activity	   (Bhaskar,	  1979	  [1998],	  27-­‐
70),	   in	  which	  the	  vehicle	   for	  social	   transformation	   is	   the	   intentional	  activities	  of	   individual	  
agents	  who	  draw	  on,	  but	  are	  not	  fully	  determined	  by,	  the	  structural	  circumstances	  in	  which	  
they	  find	  themselves	  (see	  also	  Archer	  and	  Bhaskar,	  1998).	  	  
Thus,	  the	  first	  strand	  of	  ontological	  research	  points	  to	  the	  mathematical	  methods	  of	  
economists	   and	   the	  potential	   costs	   of	   the	   increasing	  primacy	  of	  modelling	   in	  mainstream	  
economics.	  The	  second	  strand	  points	  to	  the	  need	  for	  (one	  or	  several)	  ontologically	  grounded	  
alternatives	   to	   the	  mainstream.	   But,	   whilst	   both	   of	   these	   strands	   remain	   fertile	   research	  
areas	  in	  their	  own	  right,	  they	  raise	  unanswered	  questions.	  One	  area	  where	  such	  questions	  
arise	  is	  the	  potential	  connections	  between	  mainstream	  modelling	  and	  the	  real	  world.	  Most	  
ontologists	  place	  a	   significant	  emphasis	  on	   the	   transformative	  power	  of	  human	   ideas	  and	  
activities	   in	   general,	   but	   say	   little	   about	   the	   transformative	   power	   of	   the	   economic	   ideas	  
that	   they	   criticise.	   Given	   the	   increasing	   importance	   of	   technical	   ideas	   and	   concepts	  
imported	   from	  mainstream	  economics	   in	   shaping	  policy	  and	  public	  discourse,	   this	   relative	  
silence	  is	  a	  significant	  omission1.	  
In	   this	   paper	  we	   build	   on	   the	   research	   in	   social	   ontology	   in	   order	   to	   address	   this	  
omission.	   In	   so	   doing,	   we	   propose	   a	   novel	   understanding	   of	   how	   economic	   ideas	   affect	  
reality.	  Earlier	  research	  on	  this	  question	  does	  not	  make	  use	  of	  the	  social	  ontology	  that	  we	  
have	   outlined	   above.	   Instead,	   some	   see	   the	   use	   of	   economic	   ideas	   as	   part	   of	   a	   clash	   of	  
competing	   ideologies	   whilst	   implicitly	   accepting	   the	   representative	   role	   of	   economic	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models2.	   Others	   –	   influenced	   by	   social	   constructionism	   –	   have	   defended	   the	   view	   that	  
models	  define	  economic	  reality	  (Callon,	  1998).	  Both	  of	  these	  approaches	  share	  an	  emphasis	  
on	  the	  idea	  of	  economics	  as	  intervening	  in	  the	  real	  world	  rather	  than	  seeking	  to	  represent	  
or	  describe	   it,	   but	  neither	  provides	  a	   systematic	   framework	   connecting	   this	   insight	   to	   the	  
distinctive	  epistemic	  features	  of	  modern	  economics	  research.	  
The	  purpose	  of	   this	  paper	   is	   to	  devise	  a	   set	  of	   theoretical	   tools	   that	  explores	  how	  
economic	   ideas	   interact	   with	   reality	   without	   committing	   to	   the	   thesis	   that	   these	  
interventions	   are	   constitutive	   of	   it.	   In	   Section	   2	   we	   discuss	   the	   reliance	   of	   modern	  
mainstream	   economics	   on	   modelling	   and	   explain	   its	   implications	   for	   the	   production	   of	  
economic	  knowledge.	  In	  Section	  3	  we	  connect	  our	  analysis	  of	  mainstream	  modelling	  to	  the	  
question	   of	  whether	   and	   how	   economic	  models	   represent	   economic	   reality.	   Our	   analysis	  
emphasises	   the	  detachment	  of	  models	   from	  grand	  socio-­‐economic	   theories	  and	   from	  real	  
world	  events	  and	  problems.	  We	   identify	   three	  epistemic	   features	  –	  specificity,	  portability,	  
and	   formal	   precision	   –	   that	   are	   essential	   to	   the	   production	   of	   analytical	   findings	   in	  
economics.	   These	   features	  are	  used	   to	  explain	  how	   the	  analytical	   findings	  of	  a	  model	  are	  
operationalized	   in	   policy.	   In	   Sections	   4	   and	   5	   we	   illustrate	   our	   framework	   through	   an	  
investigation	   of	   the	   definition	   and	   application	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   moral	   hazard	   by	  
economists.	   The	   deeper	   purpose	   of	   our	   illustration	   is	   to	   assess	   the	   usefulness	   of	   our	  
interpretative	   scheme	   as	   a	   vehicle	   for	   analysing	   the	   influence	   of	   models	   on	   economic	  
reality.	  	  
	  
2)	  Modelling	  in	  Mainstream	  Economics	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Philosopher	  Allan	  Gibbard	  and	  economist	  Hal	  Varian	  define	  a	  model	  as	  a	  composite	  of	  two	  
distinct	  elements:	  a	  ‘story’	  and	  a	  ‘structure’	  (Gibbard	  and	  Varian,	  1978,	  666).	  The	  ‘structure’	  
element	   refers	   to	   the	   (uninterpreted)	   formal	   system	  and	   the	   ‘story’3	   refers	   to	   the	  specific	  
economic	   interpretation	  of	   the	   logical	  machinery	  embodied	   in	   the	   structure.	  Philosophers	  
and	  historians	  have	  been	  quick	  to	  point	  out	  that	  modern	  mainstream	  economics	  is	  defined	  
by	  its	  use	  of	  models	  of	  this	  type	  (Fine	  and	  Milonakis,	  2009;	  Lawson,	  1997).	  	  
	  	   Economist’s	  work	  was	  not	  always	  defined	  by	  the	  use	  of	  models	  in	  the	  modern	  sense.	  
Econometric	  research	  produced	  early	  in	  the	  20th	  century	  first	  introduced	  the	  term	  'model'	  
into	   economics	   (Morgan,	   2012,	   1-­‐38).	   Initially	   the	   ‘stories’	   told	   by	   modellers	   were	   an	  
intermediate	   step	   between	   non	   (or	   partially)	   formalised	   economic	   theories	   (e.g.	   of	   the	  
business	   cycle)	   and	   the	   phenomena	   that	   they	   described.	   Models	   were	   designed	   for	  
"bridging	   the	   gap	   between	   theories	   of	   the	   business	   cycle	   and	   specific	   (time	   and	   place)	  
statistical	  data	  of	  the	  cycle"	  (Morgan,	  2008,	  2).	  Subsequently,	  however,	  modelling	  took	  on	  a	  
much	  broader	  role	  in	  modern	  economics.	  Rather	  than	  simply	  connecting	  general	  theoretical	  
schemes	   and	   statistical	   data,	   models	   came	   to	   play	   a	   dominant	   theoretical	   role	   as	   well:	  
“economists	   build	   models	   to	   depict	   some	   particular	   phenomenon	   or	   to	   figure	   out	   some	  
puzzle	  or	  problem	  about	  a	  set	  of	  relations	  in	  the	  economic	  world”	  (Morgan,	  2012,	  387).	  	  
	   In	   this	   theoretical	   context,	   models	   are	   now	   the	   principal	   method	   by	   which	  
economists	  hope	  to	  make	  analytical	  ‘discoveries’	  such	  as	  the	  exposition	  of	  logical	  fallacies	  or	  
the	   deduction	   of	   new	   principles	   from	   old	   premises	   (Hausman,	   1984,	   13).	   Mainstream	  
modellers	  can	   justifiably	   focus	  on	   internal,	  mathematical	  characteristics	  of	   the	  model	  as	  a	  
form	  of	   ‘conceptual	   exploration’	   that	   is	   independent	   both	  of	   general	   theoretical	   schemes	  
and	   actual	   economies	   (Hausman,	   1992).	   Indeed,	   ‘new	   style’	   economic	   theorists	   engage	  
almost	  exclusively	   in	  modelling	  and	  see	  no	  reason	  to	   invoke	  or	  defend	  a	  viable	  distinction	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between	  model	  and	  theory,	  regularly	  using	  the	  terms	  interchangeably	  (Leijonhufvud,	  1997,	  
193).	   George	   Akerlof	   (1970)	   seen	   by	  many	   as	   the	   pioneer	   of	   the	   new	   style	   of	   economic	  
theory,	   breaks	   new	   ground	   by	   defining	   his	   approach	   to	   model-­‐building	   as	   one	   which	  
eschews	   the	   study	   of	   deviations	   from	   a	   standard	   general	   theoretical	   scheme.	   Instead,	   he	  
favours	   the	  elaboration	  of	   self-­‐supporting	  models	   that	   are	   "…	   customised	   to	  describe	   the	  
salient	   features	  of	   reality	   that	  describe	  the	  special	  problem	  under	  consideration"	   (Akerlof,	  
2003,	   1).	   In	   this	   context	   models	   are	   freestanding:	   their	   ‘structure’	   gives	   form	   to	   their	  
argument	   and	   they	   relate	   to	   real	   world	   phenomena	   not	   through	   their	   connection	   to	  
theories,	  but	  directly	  through	  their	  ‘stories’.	  	  
As	   this	  model-­‐based	   approach	   has	   taken	   hold,	   economists	   have	   tended	   to	   cluster	  
around	   ‘fields’	   that	   are	   delimited	   almost	   exclusively	   by	   the	   analytical	   tools	   that	   are	  
admissible	  and	  the	  structural	  form	  of	  the	  models	  that	  they	  are	  composed	  of.	  Understanding	  
the	  way	  in	  which	  these	  fields	  function	  and	  how	  they	  relate	  to	  older	  conceptions	  of	  theory	  is	  
a	  matter	   for	  historical	  and	  empirical	   investigation	  which	  goes	  beyond	  this	  paper	   (see	  Fine	  
and	   Milonakis,	   2009;	   Milonakis	   and	   Fine,	   2009;	   Walsh,	   1987).	   However,	   Morgan	   and	  
Knuuttila	  (2012)	  provide	  an	  illuminating	  illustration	  drawn	  from	  recent	  research	  in	  the	  field	  
of	  industrial	  relations.	  Here	  a	  complex	  typology	  of	  games	  has	  developed	  in	  which,	  
	  
"the	   proliferation	   of	   cases	   and	   the	   labelling	   activity	   [of	   the	   different	   types	   of	   games]	  
suggests	   that	   we	   think	   of	   both	   these	   fields	   [referring	   to	   industrial	   relations	   and	   game	  
theory]	  not	  as	  consisting	  of	  one	  general	  theory	  (of	  industry	  or	  of	  games)	  accompanied	  by	  an	  
additional	  set	  of	  special	  cases,	  but	  as	  theoretical	  fields	  in	  which	  the	  main	  material	  consists	  of	  




Morgan	   and	   Knuuttila’s	   emphasis	   on	   the	   taxonomic	   and	   puzzle-­‐centric	   characteristics	   of	  
theoretical	  fields	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  conception	  of	  modelling	  advanced	  and	  defended	  by	  
Akerlof.	  
	   Thus,	  models	  are	  not	  expected	  to	  appeal	  to	  an	  overarching	  theory	  that	  embodies	  a	  
range	  of	  well-­‐defined	  and	  standardised	  assumptions4.	   Instead,	  the	  model	  is	   identified	  with	  
its	   logical	   and	   technical	   machinery	   (its	   structure),	   which	   may	   often	   be	   imported	   from	  
mathematics	   or	   the	   natural	   sciences	   (Davis,	   2006,	   6-­‐11).	   The	   structure	   imposes	   internal	  
consistency	  on	  the	  model	  and	  defines	  its	  location	  within	  a	  relevant	  field.	  The	  field	  itself	  is	  a	  
patchwork	   of	  models	   connected	   to	   each	   other	   principally	   by	   their	   shared	  methodological	  
standpoint,	  but	  also	  (in	  mature	  fields)	  by	  path	  dependent	  processes	  of	  research	  citation	  and	  
embedding	  into	  the	  teaching	  canon.	  	  	  
	   Fields	   may	   include	   models	   that	   reproduce	   relevantly	   similar	   stories,	   or	   target	   a	  
particular	  empirical	  phenomenon,	  but	  the	  key	  to	  holding	  a	  field	  together	  is	  the	  acceptance	  
and	  usage	  of	   a	   finite	   set	  of	   recognised	   ‘analytical	   findings’.	   These	  analytical	   findings	  must	  
have	   two	  basic	   characteristics:	   (i)	   they	  must	  be	   the	   conclusions	  of	   a	  deductive	   argument,	  
thus	   ensuring	   their	   epistemic	   status;	   (ii)	   they	   must	   relate	   to	   an	   empirical	   or	   theoretical	  
puzzle	  that	  is	  agreed	  to	  be	  relevant	  by	  participants	  in	  the	  field,	  thus	  ensuring	  their	  location	  
in	  the	  patchwork.	  An	  example	  of	  what	  we	  mean	  by	  an	  analytical	  finding	  is	  the	  construction	  
and	  use	  of	  moral	  hazard	  by	  mainstream	  economists.	  The	  genesis	  of	  this	  analytical	  finding	  in	  
economics	   and	   the	   different	   types	   of	   models	   which	   have	   been	   constructed	   to	   exemplify	  
‘moral	  hazard’	  problems	  is	  discussed	  in	  sections	  4	  and	  5.	  Our	  analysis	  of	  moral	  hazard	  also	  
shows	   that	   a	  model's	   analytical	   findings	   are	   first	   and	   foremost	   defined	  within	   the	  model	  
framework	   that	   produced	   them.	   However,	   they	   re-­‐appear	   when	   newer	   models	   develop,	  
extend,	   build	   on,	   or	   further	   apply	   them	   to	   other	   scenarios.	   	   Armed	   with	   a	   clearer	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understanding	   of	  what	  models	   are	   and	   how	   they	   are	   used	  we	  now	   turn	   our	   attention	   to	  
their	   contested	   relationship	   with	   the	   phenomena	   that	   they	   are	   supposed	   to	   illuminate,	  
analyse,	  explain	  or	  predict.	  
	  
	  
3)	  From	  representing	  to	  intervening	  
The	   existence	   of	   economic	  models	   outside	   overarching	   theoretical	   frameworks	   is	   not	   the	  
only	   intellectual	  development	   that	   characterises	   this	  new	  style	  economics.	   There	  has	  also	  
been	   a	  marked	  decline	   in	   the	   representative	   ambitions	   of	   economic	  modellers	  which	   has	  
been	  the	  subject	  of	  heated	  debate	  amongst	  philosophers	  of	  economics.	  	   	  
	   Most	   commentators	   agree	   that	   the	   assumptions	   of	   a	   theoretical	   argument	   in	  
economics	  (whether	   it's	  a	  model	  or	  a	  theory)	  need	  not	  be	  accurate	  representations	  of	  the	  
phenomena	  under	   investigation	   (see	  Mäki,	   2002;	  Morgan	   and	  Morrison,	   1999).	  However,	  
there	  is	  considerable	  disagreement	  over	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  link	  between	  assumptions	  
and	   reality	   can	   and	   should	   be	   severed.	   The	   most	   widely	   cited	   position	   in	   the	   debate	   is	  
Milton	   Friedman’s	   instrumentalist	   approach5,	   though	   many	   philosophers	   and	  
methodologists	  have	   rejected	  Friedman’s	   analysis.	  One	  plausible	   critique	   is	   that	   Friedman	  
appears	  to	  conflate	  the	  reasonable	  claim	  that	  all	  assumptions	  must	  engage	  in	  some	  form	  of	  
abstraction	   or	   simplification	   of	   reality,	   with	   the	   far	   less	   reasonable	   claim	   that	   all	  
assumptions	   can	   or	   should	   be	   demonstrably	   false	   as	   descriptions	   of	   reality	   (for	   a	   good	  
overview	  see	  Hausman,	  1992).	  	  
Having	   demonstrated	   the	   weaknesses	   of	   Friedman’s	   argument,	   however,	   many	  
philosophers	   and	   methodologists	   have	   settled	   on	   a	   position	   that	   nevertheless	   takes	   the	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representative	  ambitions	  of	  models	  as	  less	  crucial	  than	  was	  originally	  thought.	  Gibbard	  and	  
Varian	  provide	  an	  early	  and	  illuminating	  example	  of	  this	  perspective:	  
	  
"Within	   the	   class	   of	   theoretical	   models,	   we	   can	   distinguish	   between	   "descriptive"	   and	  
"ideal"	  models.	   Descriptive	  models	   attempt	   to	   describe,	   in	   some	   sense,	   economic	   reality.	  
Ideal	  models,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   are	   concerned	  with	   the	   description	   of	   some	   ideal	   case	  
which	   is	   interesting	   either	   in	   its	   own	   right	   or	   by	   comparison	   to	   reality...."	   (Gibbard	   and	  
Varian,	  1978,	  665)	  
	  
This	  passage	  is	  revelatory	  because	  of	  the	  distinction	  that	  the	  authors	  draw	  between	  types	  of	  
models	   and	   particularly	   their	   elaboration	   of	   a	   category	   of	   ‘ideal	   models’	   that	   are	  
unconnected	  to	  real	  world	  economic	  phenomena.	  	  
	   It	  is	  our	  contention	  that	  Gibbard	  and	  Varian’s	  conception	  of	  ideal	  models	  challenges	  
the	  commonsense	  notion	  of	  representation	  in	  the	  social	  sciences	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  method	  that	  
relies	  on	  the	  construction	  of	  artificial	  ‘realities’	  and	  the	  investigation	  of	  their	  mathematical	  
characteristics.	   This	   is	   a	   view	   that	   was	   subsequently	   famously	   endorsed	   by	   the	   Nobel	  
Laureate	  Robert	  Lucas:	  	  
	  
"A	  'theory'	  is	  not	  a	  collection	  of	  assertions	  about	  the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  actual	  economy	  but	  
rather	   an	   explicit	   set	   of	   instructions	   for	   building	   a	   parallel	   or	   analogue	   system	   -­‐	   a	  
mechanical,	  imitation	  economy.	  	  A	  'good'	  model,	  from	  this	  point	  of	  view,	  will	  not	  be	  exactly	  




Similar	   positions	   have	   also	   received	   qualified	   support	   from	   influential	   philosophers	   of	  
economics,	   whose	   analysis	   of	   modelling	   has	   tended	   to	   focus	   on	   rendering	   the	   opaque	  
connections	   between	   imitations	   and	   reality	   clearer	   and	   more	   precise	   rather	   than	  
questioning	   whether	   the	   construction	   of	   artificial	   realities	   is	   justifiable	   in	   the	   first	   place.	  
Thus	   Gibbard	   and	   Varian	   (1978)	   suggest	   some	   models	   should	   be	   seen	   as	   ‘caricatures’,	  
McCloskey	   (1983)	   develops	   the	  notion	  of	  models	   as	   ‘metaphors’,	  whilst	  Mäki	   (1992)	   sees	  
them	   as	   ‘laboratories’,	   and	  Morgan	   (2001)	   elaborates	   on	   the	   suggestion	   that	  models	   are	  
essentially	  ‘stories’.	  	  
	   Though	   they	   are	   different	   in	   content,	   these	   approaches	   (except	   perhaps	  
McCloskey’s)	  seek	  to	  defend	  some	  ultimate,	  though	  often	  subtle	  and	  complex,	  connection	  
between	  models	  and	  economic	  reality.	  Thus	  models	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  simplifying,	  isolating	  or	  
emphasising	   certain	   aspects	   of	   reality	   in	   order	   to	   understand	   its	   underlying	   functioning.	  
Crucially,	   though,	   a	   purified	   conception	   of	   the	   mechanisms	   at	   work	   can	   be	   constructed	  
through	  a	  model	  that	  does	  not	  seek	  to	  represent	  at	  all.	   Instead	  a	   ‘credible’	  explanation	  of	  
the	   functioning	  of	   some	  part	   of	   economic	   reality	   can	   illuminate	  by	  describing	   an	   artificial	  
world	  with	  relevantly	  similar	  characteristics	  (Sugden,	  2002,	  132-­‐3).	  
	   There	   is,	   however,	   a	   minority	   position,	   to	   which	   we	   subscribe,	   which	   rejects	   the	  
legitimacy	   of	   ideal	   models	   within	   economics.	   The	   critical	   realists	   who	   developed	   this	  
approach	   (Lawson,	  1997;	   Sayer,	   1981)	   agree	  with	   the	   conventional	   view	   that	   a	   successful	  
economic	   theory	   cannot	   engage	   in	   exhaustive	   description.	   They	   accept	   that	   economists	  
must	   simplify	   by	   excluding	   features	   that	   fallible	   background	   assumptions	   suggest	   are	  
irrelevant	  to	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  problem	  at	  hand.	  They	  do	  not,	  however,	  accept	  that	  this	  is	  
what	   economists	   do	   when	   they	   construct	   ideal	   models.	   Instead,	   they	   refer	   to	   the	  
construction	   of	   economic	   models	   as	   (false)	   idealisation	   or	   the	   adoption	   of	   ‘convenient	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fictions’	   (Lawson,	   1997,	   232-­‐7).	   They	   further	   argue	   that,	   unlike	   abstraction,	   idealisation	  
involves	  the	   introduction	  of	  assumptions	  that	  are	  known	  to	  be	  false	  by	  the	   investigator	   in	  
order	  to	  facilitate	  the	  modelling	  process	  rather	  than	  to	  simplify	  a	  complex	  and	  messy	  reality.	  	  	  
It	  may	  help	  to	  consider	  the	  use	  of	  another	  abstract	   instrument	  we	  use	   in	  everyday	  
life	  in	  order	  to	  grasp	  this	  argument.	  A	  good	  map	  will	  never	  be	  a	  complete	  description	  of	  the	  
geographical	  area	  that	  it	  represents.	  It	  will	  exclude	  bushes,	  trees,	  hedgerows,	  park	  benches,	  
and	   many	   other	   things	   besides,	   though	   they	   are	   relatively	   enduring	   features	   of	   the	  
landscape.	  However,	  for	  a	  map	  to	  be	  useful	  in	  giving	  directions,	  it	  should	  not	  misrepresent	  
the	   layout	   of	   the	   roads,	   or	   the	   location	   of	   parks,	   hospitals	   and	   airports.	   The	   key	   to	   this	  
analogy	   is	   that	   the	   maps	   or	   models	   can	   be	   permitted	   to	   exclude	   elements	   that	   can	   be	  
justified	  by	  either	  background	  theory	  or	  evidence	  as	  irrelevant,	  but	  they	  should	  not	  willingly	  
exclude	  elements	  or	   invent	   fictitious	  ones	   in	  order	   to	   facilitate	   theorisation	  or	   tractability.	  
According	  to	  critical	   realists,	  abstraction	   is	   the	  key	  to	  theorising	   in	  the	  social	  sciences,	  but	  
idealisation	  is	  the	  hallmark	  of	  recent	  economic	  modelling.	  
To	   recap	   our	   argument	   thus	   far,	   we	   have	   claimed	   that	   the	   rise	   of	   modelling	   in	  
economics	  has	  coincided	  with	  two	  related	  processes.	  First,	  the	  decline	  of	  general	  theories	  in	  
favour	   of	   fields	   populated	   by	   patchworks	   of	  models	   that	   share	   a	   family	   resemblance	   and	  
commitment	  to	  the	  centrality	  of	  a	  restricted	  set	  of	  analytical	  findings.	  Second,	  the	  gradual	  
retreat	  from	  the	  idea	  of	  models	  as	  (partial	  or	  modified)	  representations	  of	  economic	  reality.	  
As	  a	  result	  mainstream	  modelling,	  which	  combines	  these	  two	  trends,	  is	  accurately	  described	  
by	   Lucas	   as	   comprising	   an	   “analogue	   system	   -­‐	   a	   mechanical,	   imitation	   economy”	   (Lucas,	  
1980,	  697).	  	  
This	  updated	  picture	  of	  modern	  mainstream	  models	  suggests	  that	  representing	  the	  
economy	   is	   no	   longer	   their	   main	   objective.	   Consistent	   with	   this	   observation,	   economic	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sociologists	  have	  more	  recently	  been	  suggesting	  that	  thinking	  of	  models	  as	  interventions	  in	  
(rather	   than	   descriptions	   of)	   the	   economy	   is	   more	   promising	   (Callon,	   1998;	   MacKenzie,	  
2006;	   MacKenzie,	   Muniesa	   and	   Siu,	   2007;	   Santos	   and	   Rodrigues,	   2009).	   There	   is	  
considerable	  diversity	  under	   this	  broad	  rubric:	   some	  see	  models	  as	   self-­‐referential	   speech	  
acts	  (Callon,	  1998),	  others	  see	  them	  as	  akin	  to	  technical	  innovations	  (Faulhaber	  and	  Baumol,	  
1988;	   MacKenzie,	   2006;	   2008),	   still	   others	   see	   them	   as	   specific	   policy	   implementations	  
(Guala,	  2001).	  However,	  the	  key	  idea	  implicit	  in	  all	  these	  approaches	  is	  that,	  by	  providing	  a	  
tightly	  defined	  framework	  from	  which	  to	  interpret	  a	  given	  social	  situation,	  economic	  models	  
do	  not	  describe	  their	  object,	  but	  they	  may	  transform	  it.	  
We	   contend	   that	   the	   basic	   insight	   of	   this	   emerging	   literature	   on	   models	   as	  
interventions	  has	  significant	  merit.	  As	  we	  noted	  above,	  when	  models	  distance	  themselves	  
from	  their	  representative	  function,	  they	  become	  more	  detachable	  from	  theoretical	  contexts	  
and	   thus	   potentially	   more	   malleable	   as	   tools	   that	   can	   be	   used	   to	   intervene	   (either	  
intentionally	   or	   unintentionally)	   in	   economic	   arrangements,	   as	   our	   discussion	   of	   moral	  
hazard	  will	  show.	  This	  approach	  remains	  under-­‐developed	  by	  academic	  economists,	  but	  two	  
different	  strands	  of	  the	  literature	  are	  following	  this	  line	  of	  enquiry.	  One	  approach	  within	  the	  
history	  of	  economic	  thought	   literature	  has	  been	  to	   investigate	  how	  recent	  economic	   ideas	  
can	  inform	  and	  influence	  public	  opinion	  through	  popular	  journalism	  (Barber,	  2011;	  Bennett,	  
2011;	   Mata,	   2011;	   Uchitelle,	   2011).	   Another,	   usually	   referred	   to	   under	   the	   heading	   of	  
performativity,	   has	   been	   to	   investigate	   the	   socio-­‐technical	   arrangements	   that	   permit	  
models	  to	  produce	  and	  transform	  the	  institutional	  settings	  in	  which	  their	  analytical	  findings	  
are	  applied	  (Callon,	  1998;	  MacKenzie,	  2006;	  2008).	  
Possibly	  due	  to	   the	  prevalence	  of	  historical	  and	  ethnographic	  case	  studies	   in	   these	  
literatures,	   neither	   of	   these	   strands	   of	   research	   has	   attempted	   to	   provide	   a	   general	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theoretical	   lens	   through	   which	   to	   interpret	   the	   interventionist	   character	   of	   economic	  
models.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  history	  of	  economic	  thought	  literature,	  the	  tendency	  has	  been	  to	  
see	   the	   problem	   as	   purely	   an	   issue	   of	   ideology,	   where	   economic	   journalism	   is	   seen	   as	  
providing	   a	   distorted	   representation	   of	   reality	   that	   uses	   the	   purported	   objectivity	   and	  
scientific	  status	  of	  economic	  findings	  to	  quell	  debate.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  performativity	  research,	  
the	   situation	   has	   been	   reversed	   as	   researchers	   have	   argued	   that	   the	   distance	   between	  
distorted	   representation	   and	   reality	   has	   narrowed	   to	   the	   extent	   that	  what	  we	  would	   call	  
idealisations	  have	  become	  abstractions.	  	  
In	   this	   paper	   we	   develop	   a	   more	   theoretically	   grounded	   interpretation	   of	   the	  
interventionist	  role	  for	  models,	  focussing	  on	  three	  epistemic	  features	  that	  make	  them	  both	  
peculiarly	   attractive	   and	   dangerous	   as	   tools	   for	   shaping	   social	   arrangements:	   specificity,	  
portability,	  and	  formal	  precision.	  	  
Specificity	   refers	   to	   the	  origins	  of	   the	  modelling	   exercise	   and	   its	   detachment	   from	  
practical	   and	   empirical	   contexts.	   Once	   the	   assumptions	   of	   a	   model	   have	   been	   set,	   the	  
model’s	  technical	  apparatus	  delivers	  results	  detached	  from	  any	  real	  world	  problem	  context	  
as	  there	  is	  no	  requirement	  for	  a	  deep	  understanding	  of	  the	  social	  context	  of	  the	  perceived	  
problem.	  Unlike	   in	   the	  experimental	   sciences	  where	  a	  model’s	  viability	   is	  connected	  to	   its	  
applicability	   to	   empirical	   contexts,	   it	   is	   the	   distance	   of	   economic	   models	   from	   empirical	  
contexts	  that	  ensures	  their	  applicability	  (e.g.	  game	  theory	  can	  be	  used	  to	  analyse	  telecoms	  
auctions	  (see	  Guala,	  2001)	  and	  the	  Israel-­‐Palestine	  conflict).	  	  
This	   detachment	   is	   distinct	   from	   but	   related	   to	   the	   idea	   of	   portability.	   Portability	  
refers	  to	  the	  idea	  that,	  given	  a	  relatively	  precise	  technical	  specification	  and	  puzzle	  structure,	  
the	   same	   set	   of	   analytical	   findings	   can	   be	   transported	   across	   a	   range	   of	   theoretical	   and	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empirical	   contexts,	   which	   can	   then	   be	   presented	   as	   manifestations	   of	   the	   same	   basic	  
problem.	  	  
Finally,	  by	  ‘formal	  precision’	  we	  mean	  the	  set	  of	  precise	  outcomes	  that	  are	  directly	  
deduced	   from	  model	   environments	   in	  which	   all	   technical	   aspects	   are	   completely	  defined.	  
Formal	  precision	  flows	  from	  the	  technical	  machinery	  of	  the	  model	  that	  gives	  both	  form	  and	  
structure	   to	   the	   modelling	   exercise.	   This	   epistemic	   feature	   enables	   modellers	   to	   use	  
different	   models	   in	   different	   ways,	   including:	   (1)	   as	   vehicles	   of	   discovery	   for	   analytical	  
findings;	  (2)	  as	  tools	  for	  numerical	  analysis	  in	  these	  constructed	  ‘mechanical	  worlds’,	  which	  
can	  then	  be	  compared	  with	  real	  world	  data	  or	  for	  practical	  or	  policy-­‐related	  reasons;	  (3)	  for	  
didactic	   purposes,	   as	   the	   formal	   language	   and	   deductive	   logic	   of	   the	   modelling	   exercise	  
demarcates	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  discipline	  and	  becomes	  the	  only	  way	  to	  do	  economics.	  	  
In	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  paper	  these	  theoretical	  proposals	  will	  be	  further	  articulated	  
and	  put	   to	  use	   through	  a	   case	   study	  on	   the	  economic	  definition	  and	  use	  of	  moral	  hazard	  
across	  a	  number	  of	  different	  real	  world	  cases.	  	  
	  
4)	  Defining	  moral	  hazard	  
Moral	  hazard	   is	  a	  widely	  used	  concept	  within	  economics	  and	  has	  appeared	   in	  models	   in	  a	  
variety	  of	  subfields.	  It	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  the	  "actions	  of	  economic	  agents	  in	  maximising	  their	  
own	   utility	   to	   the	   detriment	   of	   others,	   in	   situations	   where	   they	   do	   not	   bear	   the	   full	  
consequences	   or,	   equivalently,	   do	   not	   enjoy	   the	   full	   benefits	   of	   their	   actions	   due	   to	  
uncertainty	   and	   incomplete	   or	   restricted	   contracts	   which	   prevent	   the	   assignments	   of	   full	  
damages	   (benefits)	   to	   the	   agent	   responsible"	   (stress	   in	   original	   Kotowitz,	   1987,	   549).	   The	  
genealogy	   of	   the	   term	   has	   also	   been	   the	   subject	   of	   a	   number	   of	   studies	   (Baker,	   1996;	  
Dembe	  and	  Boden,	  2000;	  Rowell	  and	  Connelly,	  2012).	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The	  origins	  of	  the	  term	  lie	  in	  the	  insurance	  literature	  where	  it	  was	  used	  to	  describe	  
the	  tendency	  of	  insured	  parties	  towards	  negligence	  once	  they	  are	  adequately	  covered	  in	  the	  
event	   of	   loss.	   The	   insurance	   literature	   considers	   the	   following	   two	   terms:	  moral	   hazard,	  
which	  is	  "the	  increase	  in	  probability	  of	  loss	  associated	  which	  results	  from	  evil	  tendencies	  in	  
the	  character	  of	  the	  insured	  person...."	  (Rowell	  and	  Connelly,	  2012,	  18)	  and	  morale	  hazard	  
which	  "results	  from	  the	  insured	  person's	  careless	  attitude	  towards	  the	  occurrence	  of	  losses"	  
(Rowell	   and	   Connelly,	   2012,	   18).	   This	   distinction	   has	   not	   survived	   the	   transposition	   to	  
mainstream	   economics.	   Mainstream	   economists	   have	   been	   keen	   to	   stress	   that	   their	  
discipline	   cannot	   accommodate	  moral	   terminology	   and	   thus	   that	   the	   distinction	   between	  
'evil'	   tendencies	   and	   'carelessness'	   cannot	   be	  defined	   in	   their	   analytical	   framework	   (Dow,	  
2010;	   2012b).	   Appropriately	   isolated	   and	   atomised	   agents	   would	   simply	   try	   to	   maximise	  
their	  expected	  utility	  given	  the	  model	  environment	  they	  are	  in.6	  Economists	  are	  concerned	  
with	  problems	   in	  which	  agents	   try	   to	  use	  privileged	   information	   to	   achieve	  advantageous	  
market	  outcomes,	  and	  how	  this	  changes	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  market.	  In	  cases	  when	  market	  
outcomes	  are	  suboptimal,	  economists	  may	  devise	  new	  types	  of	  contracts	  or	  novel	  ways	  of	  
signalling	  and/or	  screening	  to	  solve	  the	  perceived	  problem.	  The	  key	  point	  here	   is	   that	   the	  
moral	   quandary	   faced	   by	   insurers	   has	   been	   seemingly	   emptied	   of	   its	   moral	   content	   by	  
economists.	  
	   Thus,	  in	  economic	  terms,	  moral	  hazard	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  problem	  of	  incentives	  between	  a	  
principal	   and	   an	   agent.	   Nevertheless,	   each	  model	   explains	   the	   existence	   of	  moral	   hazard	  
differently	  depending	  on	  the	  model's	  particular	  structure.7	  This	   is	  because	  the	  behavioural	  
responses	   associated	   with	   moral	   hazard	   are	   derived	   from	   the	   model	   environment	   that	  
produces	   them.	   The	   fact	   that	   these	   responses	   are	   derivations,	   in	   our	   terms	   analytical	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findings	   of	   the	  model,	   is	   significant	   because	   it	   underwrites	   their	   removal	   from	   the	  moral	  
discourse	  of	  the	  insurance	  industry.	  Economists	  define	  agents	  as	  rational	  and	  compute	  their	  
optimal	  courses	  of	  action	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  constructed	  model	  environment,	  not	  of	  
their	  individual	  or	  collective	  value	  judgements.	  
	   This	   is	   typical	   of	   how	   analytical	   findings	   are	   created	   in	   economics.	   The	   insurance	  
literature,	  with	   its	  morally	   loaded	   language,	   is	   explicit	   in	   its	   understanding	  of	   behavioural	  
traits	   ('evil'	   character	   or	   'careless'	   behaviour)	   and	   considers	   how	   different	   people	   may	  
respond	   in	   their	   own	   way	   to	   existing	   insurance	   policies.	   The	   economists'	   reduction	   of	  
personal	   traits	   to	   those	   of	   an	   isolated,	   atomised	   and	   calculative	   individual	   maximising	   a	  
utility	   function	   recasts	   behaviour	   as	   the	   only	   rational	   response	   of	   the	   agent	   to	   his	  
environment.	   This	   response	   is	   determined	   by	   the	   specific	   details	   of	   each	   model	  
environment,	  which	  means	   that	  specific	  outcomes	  are	  valid	  or	   intelligible	  only	  within	   that	  
model	  environment	  and	  are	  a	  direct	  result	  of	  the	  particular	  aspects	  of	  the	  mechanical	  world	  
that	  it	  describes.	  	  
	   The	   way	   ideas	   are	   transported	   into	   economics	   and	   subsequently	   transformed	   is	  
directly	   related	   to	   the	   first	   of	   our	   three	   epistemic	   features,	   specificity.	  Moral	   hazard	   is	   a	  
good	  example	  of	  this	  as	  its	  transportation	  from	  the	  insurance	  literature	  required	  economists	  
to	  empty	  the	  concept	  of	  all	  social	  context.	  Therefore,	  agent	  interaction	  is	  interpreted	  solely	  
as	   a	   response	   to	   the	   specific	   incentive	   structure	  of	   a	   closed	  model	   environment.	   This	   de-­‐
contextualisation	  is	  a	  central	  feature	  of	  deriving	  analytical	  findings	  in	  economics.	  Specificity	  
ensures	  that	  this	  new	  analytical	  understanding	  of	  how	  agents	  interact	  follows	  automatically,	  
since	  agents	  with	  tightly	  specified	  capacities	  and	  objectives	  are	  driven	  towards	  a	  ‘single	  exit’	  
(Latsis,	   1976).	   The	   result	   of	   this	   academic	   exercise	   is	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   family	   of	   models	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which	  have	  an	  analytical	  affinity	  in	  that	  they	  are	  exploring	  similar	  model-­‐worlds	  and	  can	  be	  
said	   to	   be	   investigating	   problems	   of	   ‘moral	   hazard’.	   How	   varied	   the	   application	   of	   these	  
models	   can	   be	   in	   the	   real	   world,	   or,	   to	   put	   it	   another	   way,	   how	   broad	   the	   range	   of	  
application	  of	  moral	  hazard	  in	  different	  real	  world	  situations	  is	  what	  we	  now	  turn	  to.	  
	  
	  
5)	  A	  model	  intervenes:	  moral	  hazard	  and	  policy	  
Economists	  have	   investigated	   incentive	  structures	   that	  give	  rise	   to	  moral	  hazard	  problems	  
across	  a	  number	  of	  empirical	  fields	  and	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  stylized	  situations.	  In	  this	  section	  we	  
will	   concentrate	   on	   three	   different	   situations	   where	   moral	   hazard	   models	   have	   been	  
deemed	  to	  be	  very	  effective	  in	  framing	  the	  perceived	  real	  world	  problem.8	  
	   Perhaps	  the	  most	   interesting	  study	  to	  date	  of	  how	  economists'	  treatment	  of	  moral	  
hazard	   may	   intervene	   in	   and	   transform	   social	   arrangements	   can	   be	   found	   in	   a	   study	   of	  
workers'	   compensation	   schemes	   carried	   out	   by	   scholars	   in	   public	   health	   (see	  Dembe	   and	  
Boden,	   2000).	   The	   focus	   of	   the	   literature	   on	   workers’	   compensation	   is	   on	   how	   injured	  
employees	  may	  overstate	  their	   injuries	  or	  file	  fraudulent	  claims.	  According	  to	  the	  authors,	  
this	   academic	   debate	   within	   economics	   has	   had	   a	   demonstrable	   impact	   on	   policy	   by	  
undermining	  public	  support	  for	  workers	  compensation	  programs	  (Dembe	  and	  Boden,	  2000,	  
266).	   Dembe	   and	   Boden	   note	   that	   a	   significant	   part	   of	   the	   problem	   emanates	   from	   the	  
manner	  in	  which	  economists	  analyse	  the	  problem	  of	  workers'	  compensation	  schemes.	  What	  
actually	   determines	   the	   employees'	   decision	   to	   claim	   benefits	   is	   quite	   complex	   and	  may	  
involve	  "a	  variety	  of	  economic,	  legal,	  psychosocial,	  and	  medical	  factors"	  (Dembe	  and	  Boden,	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2000,	   273).	   However,	   they	   claim	   that,	   "Economists'	   focus	   on	   increasing	   benefits	   as	   a	  
supposed	  cause	  of	  employee	  claims	  reporting	  obscures	  this	  complexity	  and	  distracts	  us	  from	  
gaining	  a	  fuller	  understanding	  of	  the	  workers'	  compensation	  program"	  (Dembe	  and	  Boden,	  
2000,	  273).	  
The	   construction	  of	   convenient	   fictions	   to	   facilitate	  modelling	  does	  not	  only	   affect	  
the	   results	   of	   the	  models,	   it	   also	   leads	   economists	   to	   ignore	   (or	   assume	   away)	   a	   host	   of	  
other	  issues	  that	  affect	  compensation	  schemes,	  therefore	  reshaping	  the	  policy	  debate	  to	  fit	  
their	  understanding	  of	  the	  situation.	  9	  In	  this	  case	  this	  modelling	  framework	  ignores	  a	  host	  
of	   issues	   that	   include	   workers’	   family	   situations,	   prevalent	   social	   norms,	   beliefs,	   and	   the	  
physical	  or	  psychological	  effects	  of	  work	  and	  on-­‐the-­‐job	  injuries.	  Furthermore,	  the	  framing	  
of	  worker	   compensation	   as	   a	  moral	   hazard	  problem	  has	   also	   crowded	  out	  other	   areas	  of	  
data	  collection,	  for	  example	  how	  often	  injured	  workers	  do	  not	  file	  claims	  because	  they	  feel	  
intimidated	  or	  are	  afraid	  of	  losing	  their	  jobs.	  Thus,	  the	  initial	  abstract	  model	  environment	  is	  
supplemented	  by	   empirical	   data	   collected	  with	   that	   specific	  model	   in	  mind.	   The	   resulting	  
narrative	  is	  then	  used	  to	  frame	  the	  public	  discussion	  and	  drive	  policy-­‐making.	  
One	  of	   the	  defining	   features	  of	   the	  problem	  of	  moral	   hazard	   in	   economics	   is	   how	  
portable	  it	  has	  been.	  It	  is	  not	  perceived	  to	  be	  a	  problem	  found	  only	  in	  one	  type	  of	  market,	  
i.e.	  a	  problem	  of	  worker’s	  compensation,	  therefore	  a	  specific	  issue	  of	  labour	  markets.	  Nor	  is	  
it	  seen	  as	  a	  problem	  in	  the	  insurance	  market,	  for	  example	  when	  an	  insurance	  policy	  is	  drawn	  
between	  a	  principal	  and	  an	  agent.	  As	  section	  4	  shows,	  any	  principal-­‐agent	   interaction	  can	  
exhibit	   this	  problem.	  However,	   the	  concept	   is	  more	  portable	  than	  even	  these	  broad	   limits	  
allow.	  This	   is	  because	  what	  counts	  as	  an	   ‘agent’	  and	  the	  specific	   type	  of	   interaction	  these	  
‘agents’	  can	  have	  is	  equally	  broadly	  conceived.	  Therefore,	  principals	  and	  agents	  do	  not	  have	  
to	   be	   individuals,	   but	   can	   be	   corporations	   or	   institutions.	   Furthermore,	   the	   actual	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environment	   of	   this	   interaction	   can	   be	   almost	   anything,	   from	   the	   implicitly	   hierarchical	  
nature	   of	   an	   employer-­‐employee	   environment,	   to	   the	   client	   relationship	   between	   a	  
purchaser	  and	  a	   seller	  of	   insurance,	  or	   the	   legal	   framework	   that	  guides	   the	   interaction	  of	  
commercial	  banks	  with	  national	  governments.	  The	  ease	  by	  which	  analytical	  findings	  can	  be	  
transplanted	  between	  scenarios	  has	  been	  central	  to	  its	  use	  in	  public	  debates	  in	  the	  current	  
financial	  crisis,	  to	  which	  we	  now	  turn.	  
Moral	  hazard	  has	  been	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  key	  feature	  of	  the	  current	  economic	  crisis	  
by	   the	   majority	   of	   mainstream	   economists.	   The	   crisis	   has	   been	   seen	   to	   consist	   of	   two	  
separate	  but	   inter-­‐linked	   stages.	   In	   the	  beginning	   there	  was	   the	  banking	   crisis,	   starting	   in	  
2008	   in	   the	  US	   property	   and	   financial	   sector,	   that	   later	   lead	   to	   a	   sovereign	   debt	   crisis	   in	  
Europe	  as	  a	  number	  of	  peripheral	  euro	  area	  countries	  lost	  access	  to	  international	  financial	  
markets	  and	  could	  not	  re-­‐finance	  their	  debt.	  While	  the	  causes	  of	  the	  crisis	  remain	  contested	  
within	  the	  academic	  community,	  a	  number	  of	  economists	  have	  identified	  moral	  hazard	  as	  a	  
major	  component	  in	  both	  stages	  of	  the	  crisis	  (for	  a	  critical	  account	  see	  De	  Grauwe,	  January	  
2011).	  
This	  conventional	  wisdom	  states	  that	  the	  belief	  that	  commercial	  banks	  are	  too	  big	  to	  
fail	   led	  bankers	  to	  take	  too	  much	  risk	  and	  overextend	  lending,	  believing	  that	  if	  these	  loans	  
are	  in	  arrears	  national	  governments	  will	  have	  to	  bail	  them	  out.	  The	  same	  device	  can	  then	  be	  
used	   to	   analyse	   the	  behaviour	   of	   national	   governments	   in	  monetary	   unions,	  where	   some	  
governments	  may	  issue	  too	  much	  debt	  expecting	  to	  be	  bailed	  out	  by	  the	  solvent	  countries	  
in	  the	  union	  if	  they	  cannot	  refinance	  it.	  Thus,	  in	  both	  scenarios,	  issues	  of	  moral	  hazard	  arise	  
as	  the	  agents	  (bankers	  or	  insolvent	  states)	  have	  incentives	  to	  take	  actions	  that	  have	  adverse	  
consequences	  for	  the	  other	  agents	  in	  the	  ‘game’	  (national	  governments	  or	  solvent	  states).	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A	  concrete	  example	  of	  how	  this	  academic	  discussion	  on	  ‘moral	  hazard’	  entered	  the	  
public	   arena	   and	   eventually	   formed	   the	   policy	   response	   to	   the	   crisis	   can	   be	   seen	   in	   the	  
official	  documentation	  of	  the	  European	  Commission.	  In	  a	  current	  working	  document	  of	  the	  
commission	  that	  intends	  to	  establish	  a	  framework	  for	  the	  recovery	  and	  resolution	  of	  credit	  
institutions	   in	   the	   EU,	   the	   commission’s	   objective	   is	   “to	   help	   mitigate	   the	   disruption	   of	  
financial	   failures	   and	   reduce	  moral	   hazard	   in	   the	   future”(European	  Commission,	   2012,	   4).	  
Moral	  hazard	   is	  mentioned	  27	  times	   in	  various	  parts	  of	   the	  document.	   In	  this	  context	   it	   is	  
defined	   as	   “the	  management,	   senior	   executives	   and	   shareholders	   of	   systemic	   institutions	  
could	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  past	  evidence	  reasonable	  expect	  that	  while	  they	  stand	  to	  gain	  from	  the	  
upside	  risk	  (profits)	  of	  their	  actions,	  society	  would	  have	  to	  cover	  the	  downside	  risk	  (losses)”	  
(European	  Commission,	  2012,	  10).	  The	  authors	  of	  the	  working	  document	  further	  note	  that	  
“research	  shows	   that	   such	  a	   skewed	   incentive	  structure	  within	   financial	   institutions	   is	  not	  
only	  a	  theoretical	  proposition,	  but	  over	  time	  has	  a	  material	  impact”	  (European	  Commission,	  
2012,	  10).	  
The	  problems	  that	  arise	  from	  reducing	  the	  banking	  crisis	  to	  a	  moral	  hazard	  problem	  
have	  been	  addressed	  in	  detail	  by	  Sheila	  Dow	  (2010;	  2012a).	  Dow	  notes	  that	  an	  implication	  
of	   the	   aforementioned	   analysis	   is	   that	   regulation	   and	   banking	   practice	   should	   change	   so	  
that	   commercial	   banks	   do	   not	   enjoy	   the	   guaranteed	   support	   of	   the	   state	   in	   the	   form	   of	  
deposit	   insurance	   or	   as	   the	   lender	   of	   last	   resort,	  which	   is	   the	   aim	   of	   the	   EU	   commission	  
proposal.	   Therefore,	   the	   banking	   crisis	   is	   perceived	   to	   emanate	   from	   a	   problem	  with	   the	  
incentive	  structures	  that	  frame	  the	  relationship	  between	  clients,	  commercial	  banks	  and	  the	  
public	   sector.	   However,	   Dow	   disputes	   the	   (modelling)	   assumption	   that	   all	   inter-­‐personal	  
interaction	  can	  be	  reduced	  to	  a	  specific	  incentive	  structure.	  Furthermore,	  she	  considers	  how	  
replacing	  this	  with	  a	  framework	  of	  analysis	  that	  includes	  relationships	  of	  trust	  as	  the	  key	  to	  a	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functioning	  financial	  system,	  completely	  transforms	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  situation.	  She	  
therefore	   proposes	   an	   alternative	   understanding	   of	   the	   situation	   and	   contrasts	   it	   to	   the	  
mainstream	  approach:	  
	  
"While	  mainstream	   theory	  would	   analyse	   trust	   effectively	   as	   the	   exercise	   of	   rational	   self-­‐
interest,	   the	   open	   system	   approach	   analyses	   it	   in	   terms	   of	   conventional	   understandings	  
about	  the	  exercise	  of	  agency....	  Moral	  hazard	  [in	  Dow's	  framework]	  is	  the	  danger	  that	  these	  
understandings	  break	  down,	  eroding	  trust...."	  (Dow,	  2010,	  2-­‐3).	  	  
	  
Dow	  is	  not	  arguing	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  different	  modelling	  framework	  in	  which	  issues	  of	  trust	  and	  
reciprocity	   arise	  due	   to	   repeated	   interaction	  by	   rational	   agents.	  More	   fundamentally,	   she	  
argues	  that	  radical	  uncertainty	  is	  the	  core	  problem	  faced	  by	  market	  participants,	  and	  both	  
lenders	   and	   borrowers	   need	   to	   build	   up	   a	   relationship	   of	   trust	   for	   the	  market	   system	   to	  
work.	   This	   implies	   that	   the	   state	   is	   not	   merely	   a	   provider	   of	   incentive	   frameworks	   that	  
would	  deliver	  favourable	  market	  outcomes,	  but	  must	  also	  ensure	  the	  necessary	  conditions	  
for	  any	  type	  of	  market	  interaction	  to	  exist.	  	  
Current	  research	  on	  trust	  between	  individuals	  and	  institutions	  shows	  why	  trust	   is	  a	  
complex	   issue	   that	   cannot	   be	   boiled	   down	   to	   a	   game	   theoretic	   framework	   between	  
atomised	   agents	   (see	   Bachmann,	   2001;	   2011;	   Granovetter,	   1985).	   Reinhard	   Bachmann	  
distinguishes	   between	   interaction-­‐based	   trust,	   which	   is	   trust	   that	   develops	   between	  
repeatedly	   interacting	   agents,	   and	   institutional-­‐based	   trust,	   which	   is	   trust	   that	  
“constitutively	   builds	  on	   institutional	   arrangements”(Bachmann,	   2011,	   206).	   Following	   the	  
work	   of	   (Luhmann,	   1979)	   on	   trust,	   he	   argues	   that	   it	   is	   “trust	   in	   institutions”(Bachmann,	  
2011,	   209)	   that	   is	   central	   in	   providing	   structure	   to	   the	   agent’s	   world	   and	   reducing	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uncertainty.	  He	  notes	  that	  this	  crisis	  “was	  not	  induced	  by	  individuals’	  fraudulent	  ambitions	  
but	   by	   inappropriate	   collective	   strategies	   and	   systemic	   effects”(Bachmann,	   2011,	   209).	  
Therefore	  what	  is	  needed	  is	  to	  strengthen	  the	  trust	  market	  participants	  and	  the	  public	  has	  
in	   institutions.	   This	   can	   be	   done	   by	   making	   institutions	   effective	   and	   fair	   in	   how	   they	  
approach	  and	  resolve	  crises,	  rather	  than	  trying	  to	  find	  the	  incentive	  structure	  that	  will	  make	  
atomised	  actors	  mechanically	  produce	  optimal	  outcomes.	  
Thus,	   casting	   the	   banking	   crisis	   as	   a	   moral	   hazard	   problem	   that	   boils	   down	   to	  
misaligned	  incentives	  does	  not	  constitute	  a	  partial,	  abstracted	  or	  approximate	  picture	  of	  the	  
social	   world,	   but	   a	   different	   picture	   altogether.	   	   Modelling	   itself	   is	   the	   lynchpin	   of	   this	  
transformation.	   In	   order	   to	   interpret	   the	   banking	   crisis	   as	   a	   moral	   hazard	   problem	  
economists	   must	   comprehensively	   define	   the	   model	   world	   in	   terms	   of	   risk-­‐weighted	  
potential	   outcomes	   within	   a	   structure	   of	   skewed	   incentives,	   whilst	   re-­‐describing	   actors	  
(individual	  and	   institutional)	   as	   rational	  maximisers	  who	   respond	   in	  a	  determinate	  way	   to	  
specific	   stimuli.	   The	   creation	   of	   alternative	   institutions	   or	   agency	   structures	   with	   other	  
capabilities	  that	  cannot	  be	  readily	  fitted	  to	  this	  incentive	  framework	  is	  not	  admissible	  within	  
the	  confines	  of	  the	  model.	  
Nevertheless,	   economists	   have	   considered	   how	  manipulating	   existing	   institutional	  
arrangements	  can	  solve	  the	  perceived	  'core'	  moral	  hazard	  problem.	  Alternative	  institutional	  
structures	   resurface	   regularly	   in	   the	   recent	   debates	   about	   the	   European	   sovereign	   debt	  
crisis.	  These	  models	  have	  come	  to	  the	  fore	  since	  the	  1990's,	  partly	  due	  to	  moves	  towards	  
greater	  financial	  integration	  in	  Europe	  (in	  response	  to	  and	  feeding	  into	  policy	  debates).	  One	  
well-­‐known	   example	   is	   (Persson	   and	   Tabellini,	   1996)	   that	   considers	   how	   risk	   sharing	   in	   a	  
union	  can	  create	  problems	  of	  moral	  hazard.	  The	  authors	  find	  that	  in	  an	  institutional	  setting	  
similar	  to	  that	  of	  the	  EU,	  intra-­‐state	  transfers	  which	  create	  Union-­‐wide	  risk-­‐sharing	  schemes	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lead	   to	  moral	   hazard,	   as	   states	   do	   not	   internalise	   how	   their	   behaviour	   on	   risk	   influences	  
other	   states’	   welfare.	   This	   leads	   to	   under-­‐provision	   in	   investment	   by	   governments.	   If	  
governments	   did	   not	   participate	   in	   a	   risk-­‐sharing	   scheme	   then	   they	   would	   undertake	  
investment	  that	  would	  reduce	  the	  risk	  of	  an	  adverse	  shock	   in	  the	  economy,	  as	   they	  could	  
not	  rely	  on	  financing	  from	  the	  other	  state.	  Thus	  risk-­‐sharing	  schemes	  lead	  to	  equilibria	  that	  
are	   inefficient	   in	   comparison	   to	   the	   optimal	   response	   that	   would	   arise	   if	   country	  
governments	  fully	  internalised	  the	  effect	  a	  negative	  shock	  would	  have	  to	  the	  other	  country's	  
finances.	  	  
	   This	  model	  environment	  develops	  a	  typical	  moral	  hazard	  narrative	  on	  how	  the	  merits	  
of	  a	  risk-­‐sharing	  union	  are	  undermined	  by	  the	  perverse	  incentives	  that	  the	  union	  creates	  for	  
national	   governments	   and	   their	   voters.	   In	   this	   context,	   the	   exact	   institutional	   setting	  
becomes	   important	   for	   the	   incentives	   that	   the	   different	   players	   have	   when	   they	   try	   to	  
optimise	   their	   behaviour.	   It	   is	   also	   important	   because	   it	   demarcates	   what	   the	   different	  
agents	   can	   and	   cannot	   do.	   This	   leads	   Persson	   and	   Tabellini	   to	   consider	   "which	   federal	  
institutions	   are	   more	   desirable"	   (Persson	   and	   Tabellini,	   1996,	   624)	   within	   the	   modelling	  
framework.	   Thus	   different	   systems	   of	   governance	   would	   lead	   to	   different	   economic	  
outcomes,	  as	  they	  would	  provide	  the	  agents	  –	  in	  this	  case	  voters–	  with	  different	  incentives,	  
leading	  to	  efficient	  or	  inefficient	  results.	  The	  economist's	  problem	  is	  how	  to	  find	  the	  system	  
of	   federal	   governance	   that	   reduces	   incentive	   problems	   to	   a	   minimum.	   The	   latter	  
institutional	  structure	  is	  then	  deemed	  to	  be	  optimal	  (see	  Persson	  and	  Tabellini,	  1996,	  644).	  
	   Current	  policy	  analysis	  of	   the	  Eurocrisis	   tends	   to	  mirror	   this	   line	  of	  argumentation.	  
For	   example,	   John	  Muellbauer	   notes	   in	   a	   recent	   policy	   paper	   that	   the	   "eurozone	   is	   in	   an	  
existential	   crisis"	   and	   summarises	   the	   problem	   as	   perceived	   by	   the	   economist,	   by	   noting	  
that	   the	   Eurozone	   "needs	   to	   create	   the	   right	   incentives	   through	   a	  mixture	  of	   carrots	   and	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sticks	   to	   enable	   the	   poorly	   performing	   economies	   to	   return	   to	   economic	   growth	   and	   to	  
avoid	   a	   future	   existential	   crisis.	   It	   needs	   to	   discourage	  moral	   hazard	   and	   arrive	   at	   a	   fair	  
distribution	   of	   burden	   sharing	   between	   taxpayers	   in	   different	   countries	   and	   holders	   of	  
sovereign	   and	   bank	   bonds"	   (Muellbauer,	   October	   2011,	   1).	   Muellbauer	   translates	   the	  
theoretical	   model	   into	   policy	   language,	   affirming	   the	   model’s	   assumption	   that	   actual	  
institutional	   arrangements	   are	   a	   mere	   proxy	   for	   the	   incentive	   structure	   of	   the	   relevant	  
agents	  in	  a	  moral	  hazard	  setting.	  From	  a	  mechanical	  world	  without	  representative	  ambitions	  
(the	  theoretical	  model),	  the	  economist	  has	  seamlessly	  produced	  a	  vehicle	  for	  assessing	  and	  
transforming	  existing	  institutions.	  	  
	  In	   the	   three	   policy	   situations	   considered	   the	   economist's	   use	   of	   moral	   hazard	  
reduces	   the	   complicated	   interactions	   between	   agents	   to	   a	   simple	   incentive	   problem.	  Any	  
institutional	   process,	   from	   the	   labour	   market,	   to	   the	   credit	   market,	   or	   even	   intra-­‐
governmental	  institutional	  interaction	  or	  electoral	  systems,	  can	  be	  analysed	  as	  an	  expected	  
utility	   maximising	   problem	   in	   which	  moral	   hazard	   can	   be	   shown	   to	   be	   present.	   In	   these	  
three	   case	   studies	   we	   have	   seen	   three	   different	   forms	   of	   idealisation.	   With	   worker	  
compensation	  schemes	  the	  complex	  relationship	  between	  employer	  and	  employee	  situated	  
in	   a	   social	   environment	   is	   reduced	   to	   an	   incentive	   problem	   for	   filing	   claims.	   With	   the	  
banking	  crisis	  complex	  issues	  of	  trust	  and	  fundamental	  uncertainty	  are	  reduced	  to	  rational	  
responses	  of	  agents	   taking	  risky	  decisions.	  Finally,	   in	   the	  case	  of	   the	  sovereign	  debt	  crisis,	  
entire	  institutions	  and	  their	  intricate	  constraining	  and	  enabling	  effects	  on	  individual	  action,	  
are	   reduced	   to	   a	   game	   in	   which	   institutions	   perform	   very	   specific	   and	   pre-­‐determined	  
functions.	  	  
It	   is	   important	   to	   note	  how	   limited	   this	   view	  of	   institutions	   is.	   Institutions	   are	  not	  
perceived	   to	   be	   able	   to	   change	   or	   evolve	   in	   response	   to	   a	   crisis	   as	   unforeseen	   situations	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develop,	  and	  instead	  the	  focus	  when	  assessing	  institutional	  effectiveness	  or	  setting	  up	  new	  
institutions	  is	  to	  make	  the	  institution’s	  purpose	  and	  charter	  transparent,	  so	  that	  its	  scope	  for	  
action	   is	   clearly	   demarcated.	   By	   making	   institutional	   responses	   rigid	   and	   predetermined,	  
then,	  the	  model’s	  perceived	  structure	  is	  replicated	  in	  the	  real	  world,	  with	  little	  recognition	  
for	  the	  distance	  between	  the	  real	  world	  and	  that	  of	  the	  model.	  	  
Through	   this	   discussion	  we	  have	   attempted	   to	  demonstrate	  how	   the	  model	  world	  
can	   intervene	   in	   a	   tangible	   fashion	   and	   influence	   real	   world	   phenomena	   not	   only	   by	  
interpreting,	   but	   also	   by	   assessing	   and	   setting	   the	   public	   policy	   agenda.	  Our	   analysis	   and	  
that	  of	  other	  critical	  scholars	  brings	  out	  the	  three	  epistemic	  features	  of	  models	  introduced	  
in	  section	  3.	  We	  have	  shown	  that	  specificity	  is	  central	  to	  the	  construction	  of	  moral	  hazard	  as	  
an	   analytical	   finding.	   However,	   it	   does	   much	   more	   than	   that.	   By	   decontextualizing	   the	  
finding	  and	  setting	   it	  as	  an	  abstract	  problem	  detached	   from	  reality	   it	  places	   the	  analytical	  
finding	  effectively	  beyond	  empirical	  falsification.	  Any	  question	  as	  to	  why	  the	  results	  found	  in	  
the	   model	   world	   do	   not	   correspond	   with	   reality	   can	   be	   dealt	   with	   by	   resorting	   to	   a	  
discussion	  of	  the	  distance	  between	  the	  relevant	  modelling	  assumptions	  and	  the	  real	  world	  
situation.	  Thus	  the	  general	  analytical	   finding,	   in	  this	  case	  the	  existence	  of	  moral	  hazard,	   is	  
never	  seriously	  in	  dispute.	  Only	  the	  details	  of	  the	  model	  structure	  –	  and	  perhaps	  the	  specific	  
type	  of	  moral	  hazard	  which	  may	  be	  relevant	  –	  are	  open	  to	  debate.	  What	  remains	  is	  that	  the	  
real	  world	  problem	  is	  seen	  as	  some	  type	  of	  moral	  hazard	  problem.	  This	  fundamental	  insight	  
frames	   the	   discussion,	   obliging	   the	   various	   participants	   to	   use	   the	  modelling	   terminology	  
and	   apply	   the	   general	   structure	   of	   argument	   and	   approach	   that	   gives	   rise	   to	   this	   type	   of	  
discourse.	  
An	  example	  of	  this	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  proposal	  on	  financial	  stability	  prepared	  by	  the	  
European	   Commission.	   The	   commission	   report,	   motivated	   by	   a	   wish	   to	   reduce	   ‘moral	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hazard’,	   proposed	  bank	   resolution	   as	   a	   disciplining	  device	   against	   excessive	   risk	   taking	  by	  
commercial	  banks.	  One	  of	  the	  issues	  considered	  has	  to	  do	  with	  raising	  the	  funds	  necessary	  
for	  banks	  to	  be	  resolved	  in	  a	  way	  that	  financial	  stability	  is	  maintained.	  The	  finance	  industry	  
in	  the	  public	  consultation	  of	  this	  proposal	  argued	  against	  a	  plan	  by	  the	  commission	  to	  raise	  
funds	  for	  this	  resolution	  program	  from	  the	  finance	  sector,	  suggesting	  that	  existing	  funds	  at	  
national	   level	  are	  adequate	  and	  there	  was	  no	  need	  for	  an	  EU	  wide	  fund.	  The	  industry	  also	  
added	   that	   such	  a	  measure	  will	   “increase	  moral	  hazard”	   (European	  Commission,	  2012,	  59	  
and	   232)	   as	   there	   would	   be	   “less	   incentive	   for	   market	   participants	   to	   police	   the	  
system”(European	   Commission,	   2012,	   232).	   This	   brings	   to	   the	   fore	   an	   interesting	  
contradiction:	   the	  new	   financial	   framework	   that	   should	   reduce	  one	   type	  of	  moral	  hazard,	  
may	  actually	  be	  increasing	  another	  type.	  Beyond	  these	  disagreements	  fuelled	  by	  conflicting	  
interests,	   the	   example	   demonstrates	   that	   the	  whole	   public	   discussion	  must	   fit	  within	   the	  
broader	  modelling	   framework.	   It	   is	   this	   broader	   framework	   that	   delineates	  what	   can	   and	  
cannot	   happen	   in	   the	   policy	   arena,	   and	   which	   arguments	   are	   admissible	   in	   policy	  
discussions.	  
The	   story	   of	   specificity	   and	   the	   family	   of	  moral	   hazard	   problems	   that	   economists	  
‘discover’	   in	   the	   real	   world,	   is	   closely	   related	   to	   the	   ability	   to	   transport	   ‘moral	   hazard’	  
between	  situational	  scenarios.	  This	  portability	  has	  two	  distinct	  uses	   in	  the	  policy	  arena	  (1)	  
extending	  the	  domain	  of	  abstract	  theory	  to	  a	  host	  of	  real	  world	  situations	  and	  (2)	  giving	  a	  
sense	  of	  continuity	  in	  the	  economist’s	  view	  of	  the	  world.	  Since	  moral	  hazard	  is	  a	  problem	  of	  
economics,	  any	  situational	  scenario	  that	  can	  fit	  into	  this	  framework	  is	  within	  the	  domain	  of	  
economic	  analysis.	  Furthermore,	  economists	  can	  ex	  cathedra	  say	  something	  about	  this	  real	  
world	   problem,	   propose	   solutions	   or	   sketch	   policy	   interventions,	   and	   even	   import	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experience	  gained	   in	  another	  field	  of	  study	  where	  the	  same	  ‘perceived’	  core	  problem	  was	  
present.	  
This	  ability	  to	  transplant	  analysis	  between	  disparate	  real	  world	  problems	  is	  related	  to	  
our	  third	  epistemic	  criterion	  of	  formal	  precision.	  What	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  our	  analysis	  of	  moral	  
hazard	  is	  that	  the	  term	  combines	  a	  generic	  description	  of	  the	  real	  world	  situation	  with	  the	  
ability	  to	  effectively	  transform	  the	  public	  debate	  to	  fit	  its	  framework.	  Moral	  hazard	  models	  
use	  deductive	  logic	  and	  technical	  machinery	  of	  some	  sophistication,	  making	  them	  appear	  to	  
share	  epistemic	   features	  with	   the	  natural	   sciences.	  The	   fact	   that	   the	  economist	   can	   show	  
precise	  modelling	  outcomes	   for	   the	  abstract	  problem	   that	  he	  has	   set	  himself,	   and	   can,	   in	  
many	   cases,	   collect	   data	   with	   this	   model	   in	   mind	   further	   tightens	   the	   perceived	   link	  
between	   this	   theoretical	   approach	   and	   scientific	   research	   as	   carried	   out	   in	   the	   natural	  
sciences.	   This	   technical	   sophistication	   adds	   scientific	   credibility	   to	   the	   mainstream	  
perspective,	  thus	  crowding	  out	  potentially	  legitimate	  alternatives.	  	  
We	   have	   argued	   that	   all	   three	   epistemic	   features	   are	   key	   to	   understanding	   how	  
analytical	   findings	  are	  created	   in	  economics,	  and	  how	  they	  enter	  and	  transform	  the	  policy	  
debate	   in	   real	   world	   situations.	   This	   interpretive	   scheme	   was	   able	   to	   reconcile	   two	  
remarkable	  features	  of	  the	  moral	  hazard	  story.	  These	  are	  (1)	  moral	  hazard	  has	  been	  seen	  to	  
be	   a	   core	   tangible	   problem	   in	   a	   number	   of	   different	   real	   world	   situations	   and	   (2)	   it	   is	  
perceived	   to	   be	   an	   abstract	   analytical	   problem	   found	   in	   highly	   stylised	   models	   of	   agent	  
interaction	   in	  academic	  economics.	  Because	  economics	   is	  viewed	  as	   the	  most	   scientific	  of	  
the	   social	   sciences,	   this	   detachment	   from	   reality	   is	   expected	   by	   the	   public.	   Economic	  
findings	   are	   seen	   as	   emanating	   from	  a	   dispassionate	   scientific	   viewpoint	   that	   lies	   beyond	  
interests	  and	  ideology.	  	  
27	  
	  
This	   goes	   some	   way	   towards	   explaining	   the	   wide	   appeal	   of	   moral	   hazard	  
explanations	  in	  the	  popular	  media	  and	  in	  policy	  circles	  in	  the	  three	  cases	  we	  investigated	  in	  
this	  section.	  It	  also	  explains	  why	  alternative	  viewpoints	  that	  cannot	  fit	   into	  this	  framework	  
are	  marginalised	   in	  both	  policy	  and	  public	  discussion.	  Dembe	  and	  Boden	  note	  this	   in	  their	  
work	   on	   worker	   compensation	   where	   more	   complex	   views	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	  
employer	   and	   employee	   that	   integrate	   sociological	   insights	   are	   marginalised.	   For	  
commercial	   banks	   and	   the	   financial	   crisis	   we	   noted	   how	   the	   problem	   of	   fundamental	  
uncertainty	   and	   trust	   in	   institutions	   was	   sidestepped	   as	   the	   discussion	   focused	   on	  
misaligned	  incentives	  between	  the	  different	  agents.	  Finally,	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  euro	  sovereign	  
debt	   crisis	   Paul	   De	   Grauwe	   describes	   how	   the	   use	   of	   moral	   hazard	   by	   the	   press	   has	  
transformed	  public	  discussion	  in	  some	  European	  countries	  (see	  De	  Grauwe,	  January	  2011).	  
This	  has	  influenced	  the	  types	  of	  political	  solutions	  electorates	  and	  governments	  are	  willing	  
to	  accept	  for	  resolving	  the	  crisis.	  The	  ramifications	  of	  this	  last	  intervention	  are	  even	  wider.	  
The	  whole	  E.U.	   framework	  with	   its	   complex	   institutional	   structure	  and	  grand	  ambitions	   is	  
now	  represented	  by	  part	  of	  the	  press	  and	  increasingly	  seen	  by	  part	  of	  the	  public	  as	  an	  arena	  
for	   one-­‐dimensional	   national	   interests,	   where	   national	   governments	   pursue	   well	   defined	  
goals	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  each	  other.	  	  
	   	  
6)	  Conclusion	  
It	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  economics	  has	  always	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  impose	  a	  view	  of	  the	  social	  
world	   and	   suggest	   methods	   of	   intervention,	   due	   to	   the	   nature	   and	   objectives	   of	   the	  
discipline.	   Any	   economic	   concept	   from	   marginal	   analysis	   to	   opportunity	   cost	   or	   scarcity	  
could	   display	   aspects	   of	   our	   three	   defining	   epistemic	   features:	   specificity,	   portability,	   and	  
formal	  precision.	  What	  is	  different,	  then,	  about	  modern	  modelling?	  Why	  do	  we	  need	  a	  novel	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framework	  of	  analysis	  to	  understand	  the	  role	  of	  moral	  hazard	  as	  a	  device	  for	  intervening	  in	  
the	  social	  world?	  
	   Part	   of	   the	   answer	   lies	   in	   the	   transformation	   that	   has	   occurred	  within	   economics,	  
and	  was	  described	  in	  sections	  2	  and	  3.	  We	  argue	  that	  the	  demise	  of	  general	  theories	  as	  the	  
core	  analytical	  devices	  of	  economics	  and	  their	  replacement	  by	  fields	  populated	  by	  distinct	  
models,	  creates	  a	  fundamental	  problem	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘intervention’	  itself.	  Models	  lead	  to	  
specific	  policy	   recommendations	  derived	   from	  their	   structure,	  but	   there	   is	  no	  expectation	  
that	  different	  analytical	  findings	  can	  be	  meaningfully	  synthesised,	  or	  even	  that	  they	  must	  be	  
non-­‐contradictory.	   It	   is	   in	   this	   setting	   that	   our	   three	   epistemic	   features	   tell	   us	   something	  
different	  about	  current	  economic	  interventions	  as	  demonstrated	  by	  the	  use	  of	  moral	  hazard	  
models	   in	   the	   three	   policy	   contexts	   described	   above.	   Moral	   hazard,	   defined	   and	  
circumscribed	   by	   its	   formal	   setting,	   has	   been	   transported	   across	   policy	   contexts	   without	  
reference	  to	  an	  overarching	  theoretical	  superstructure.	  There	  is	  also	  little	  or	  no	  attempt	  to	  
explain	  why	  analytical	  findings	  are	  relevant	  within	  the	  policy	  context	  other	  than	  the	  abstract	  
claim	  that	  the	  situation	  can	  be	  composed	  as	  a	  principal-­‐agent	  problem.	  
	   Our	  illustration	  shows	  that	  the	  three	  epistemic	  features	  of	  specificity,	  portability	  and	  
formal	  precision	   function	   synthetically	   to	  provide	  a	   framework	   for	   analysing	  how	  modern	  
economic	  models	  intervene	  in	  the	  social	  sphere.	  Thus,	  the	  analytical	  findings	  derived	  from	  a	  
model	   must	   display	   specificity,	   in	   order	   for	   them	   to	   be	   detachable	   from	   any	   specific	  
situational	   scenario.	   Should	   this	   be	   the	   case,	   they	   can	   be	   applied	   to	   different	   scenarios,	  
displaying	  portability.	  They	  also	  maintain	  the	  formal	  precision	  necessary	  for	  retaining	  their	  
purportedly	  scientific	  status	  and	  delivering	  outcomes	  that	  can	  be	  used	  in	  policy	  analysis.	  We	  
have	   shown	   how	   the	   idea	   of	   moral	   hazard	   displays	   all	   these	   characteristics	   and	   has	  
generated	  key	  analytical	   findings	  used	  by	  economists	   in	  a	  variety	  of	  real	  world	  settings.	   In	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this	  manner,	  moral	  hazard	  has	  been	  transformed	  from	  an	  explanatory	  device	  developed	  in	  
the	   insurance	   industry,	   to	   a	   tool	   for	   economic	   policy	   intervention	   and	   the	   resolution	   of	  
perceived	  problems	  in	  the	  social	  sphere.	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1	   Critical	   realists	   have	   recently	   started	   working	   in	   this	   direction,	   noting	   that	   while	   mainstream	   modelling	  
cannot	   explain	   reality,	   it	   nevertheless	   affects	   “policy	   and	   broader	   models	   of	   thought,	   which	   then	   affect	  
organisation	  and	  institutions	  within	  the	  economy”	  (Morgan,	  2013,	  4).	  Jamie	  Morgan	  (2013)	  explores	  how	  this	  
interdependence	  influenced	  financial	  policy	  in	  the	  period	  prior	  to	  the	  current	  financial	  crisis.	  	  	  	  
2	   Tiago	   Mata	   notes	   an	   interesting	   distinction	   on	   how	   economics	   is	   reported	   in	   the	   press.	   He	   separates	  
‘economics	  as	  politics’	  and	  ‘economics	  as	  science’	  in	  order	  to	  mark	  the	  “ambiguous	  status	  of	  economic	  stories	  
in	  newsrooms”(Mata,	  2011,	  382).	  Therefore,	  “at	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  one	  observes	  a	  distinction	  between	  the	  
stories	  written	  for	  the	  national	  desk,	  which	  tend	  to	  be	  stories	  about	  politics	  or	  with	  a	  political	  cast,	  and	  those	  
written	   for	   the	   specialist,	   finance,	   or	   business	   sections,	   which	   resemble	   reporting	   on	   science”(Mata,	   2011,	  
383).	  	  Therefore,	  both	  the	  scientific	  claim	  of	  economics	  and	  its	  ideological	  bias	  are	  reconciled	  in	  this	  approach	  
of	  analysing	  how	  the	  popular	  press	  reports	  academic	  economics.	  
3	  The	  relationship	  between	  models,	  stories	  and	  other	  related	  concepts	  is	  complex	  and	  contested.	  For	  an	  up	  to	  
date	  overview	  and	  discussion	  see	  (Morgan,	  2012,	  217-­‐255).	  
4	   This	   point	   has	   also	  been	  made	  by	  methodologists	  working	  on	  pluralism	   in	  mainstream	  economics	   such	   as	  
Colander(2000)	  and	  Davis(2006).	  Though	  they	  do	  not	  focus	  on	  modeling	  per	  se,	  the	  authors	  have	  pointed	  out	  
that	  referring	  to	  modern	  mainstream	  contributions	  as	  part	  of	  ‘neoclassical	  theory’	  is	  highly	  problematic	  since	  
almost	  any	  plausible	  definition	  of	  the	  basic	  assumptions	  of	  the	  latter	  would	  be	  violated	  by	  most	  ‘cutting	  edge’	  
mainstream	  contributions.	  Significantly,	   the	  centrality	  of	  mathematical	  modeling	   in	  economics	   is	   taken	  more	  
or	  less	  for	  granted.	  
5	  The	  debate	  goes	  back	  to	  Milton	  Friedman’s	  (1953)	  infamous	  defence	  of	  economic	  theory	  in	  The	  Methodology	  
of	   Positive	   Economics,	   which	   launched	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘assumptions	   debate’.	   Echoing	   instrumentalist	   claims	  
coming	  from	  the	  philosophy	  of	  science,	  Friedman	  argued	  that	  the	  depictions	  of	  agents	  and	  firms	  employed	  by	  
economic	  theorists	  in	  their	  models	  should	  not	  be	  assessed	  as	  descriptive	  claims	  about	  the	  world.	  	  On	  this	  line	  
of	  thought,	  economic	  models	  are	  not	  designed	  to	  pick	  out	  features	  of	  the	  world	  and	  explain	  their	  functioning.	  
Economists	  should	  not	  strive	  to	  make	  them	  more	  complex	  or	  realistic,	   indeed,	  by	  doing	  so	  they	  may	  actually	  
limit	  the	  utility	  of	  their	  models.	  Rather,	  Friedman’s	  defence	  of	  unrealistic	  assumptions	  saw	  the	  sole	  objective	  
of	  economics	  as	  the	  production	  of	  accurate	  predictions	  of	  large	  scale	  patterns	  in	  human	  behaviour.	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6	   Dembe	   and	   Boden	   (2000)	   as	   well	   as	   Dow	   (2010)	   note	   this	   in	   relation	   to	   Arrow's	   (1963)	   	   paper	   and	   the	  
academic	  discussion	  that	  ensued.	  (Arrow,	  1963)	  is	  one	  of	  the	  first	  papers	  to	  formally	  introduce	  moral	  hazard	  in	  
connection	  to	  health	   insurance.	   In	  the	  paper	  Arrow	  discusses	  the	  role	  of	  social	  conventions	  and	  professional	  
ethics	  in	  shaping	  the	  relevant	  market	  outcome	  and	  reducing	  the	  problem	  of	  moral	  hazard.	  However,	  Pauly	  in	  
an	   almost	   contemporary	   note	   on	   Arrow's	   paper	  writes	   "my	   analysis	   shows,	   however,	   that	   the	   response	   of	  
seeking	  more	  medical	  care	  with	  insurance	  than	  in	   its	  absence	  is	  a	  result	  not	  of	  moral	  perfidy,	  but	  of	  rational	  
economic	  behaviour"	  (Pauly,	  1968,	  535	  also	  noted	  in	  Dembe	  and	  Boden,	  2000,	  263)	  and	  adds	  "the	  problem	  of	  
'moral	  hazard'	  in	  insurance	  has,	  in	  fact,	  little	  to	  do	  with	  morality,	  but	  can	  be	  analyzed	  with	  orthodox	  economic	  
tools"	  (Pauly,	  1968,	  535).	  
7	   This	   is	  noted	   in	   key	  economics	   textbooks.	   For	  example	   in	  Microeconomic	  Theory,	   by	  Mas-­‐Colell,	  Whinston	  
and	  Green,	  	  it	  is	  pointed	  out	  that	  "the	  literature's	  use	  of	  the	  term	  moral	  hazard	  is	  not	  entirely	  uniform"	  (Mas-­‐
Colell,	  Whinston	  and	  Green,	  1995,	  447	  fn.	  1).	  	  
8	   This	   is	   not	   meant	   to	   be	   an	   exhaustive	   list	   of	   all	   uses	   of	   moral	   hazard	   in	   policy	   discussions.	   E.g.	   health	  
insurance	  has	  been	  a	  field	  in	  which	  economists	  have	  identified	  moral	  hazard	  being	  a	  major	  problem	  since	  the	  
work	  of	  Arrow	   (1963)	  and	  Pauly	   (1968).	   This	  has	  had	  a	  profound	   influence	  on	  how	  healthcare	  policies	  have	  
developed	  in	  the	  US	   in	  the	   last	  50	  years.	  A	  critical	  view	  on	  how	  moral	  hazard	  has	  affected	  the	  discussion	  on	  
universal	  health	  insurance	  in	  the	  US	  can	  be	  found	  in	  (Gladwell,	  2005).	  	  
9	  Morgan	   in	  his	  analysis	  of	   the	  period	  prior	   to	   the	   financial	   crises	  makes	  a	   similar	  argument	  noting	   that	   the	  
framework	  of	   analysis	  driven	  by	  mainstream	  modelling	   created	   ‘blind	   spots’	  on	  policymakers	  perceiving	   the	  
underlying	  problems	  and	  understanding	  what	  is	  really	  happening.	  He	  notes	  how	  during	  this	  period	  of	  relative	  
financial	   stability	   the	   focus	   of	   economists	   on	   price	   stability,	   “made	   an	   orientation	   on	   possible	   sources	   of	  
financial	   system	   instability	   less	   urgent	   ”(Morgan,	   2013,	   11).	   The	   two	   objectives	   seemed	   over	   time	   to	   have	  
merged	  so	  that	  “insofar	  as	  there	  was	  price	  stability,	  there	  was	  also	  financial	  stability”(Morgan,	  2013,	  11).	  	  
